Thick and Thin Moral Concepts

Thick moral concepts, like "courageous," "cruel," or "generous," are considered 'thick' because they simultaneously describe a state of affairs and express a moral evaluation of it. They are fact-laden, meaning their application requires understanding specific details about the situation and the agent's actions. This descriptive element differentiates them from purely evaluative terms.

Thin moral concepts, such as "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong," primarily serve to express moral judgment. They lack the rich descriptive content of thick concepts and offer little information about the specific actions or character traits being evaluated. Their function is primarily to commend or condemn.

The distinction between thick and thin moral concepts highlights a fundamental debate in metaethics: the relationship between moral judgments and factual descriptions. Some philosophers argue that thick concepts demonstrate an inseparability of facts and values, while others maintain that the evaluative component can always be extracted.

Bernard Williams significantly popularized the distinction between thick and thin concepts in his work "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy." He argued that thick concepts are essential for ethical reasoning because they provide a bridge between abstract moral principles and concrete situations. He believed they were essential for ethical understanding.

One key aspect of thick concepts is their "action-guidingness." Because they contain descriptive content, they can directly inform our actions by providing specific guidance on how to behave in certain situations. Thin concepts, being more abstract, require further interpretation to be translated into practical action.

The application of thick and thin concepts can be seen in moral debates. For example, discussions about "fairness" (thick) often involve disagreements about the specific distribution of resources or opportunities, whereas debates about "goodness" (thin) are often more abstract and philosophical.

Some philosophers argue that thick concepts are culturally specific, meaning that their meaning and application can vary across different societies. This raises questions about the objectivity of moral judgments and the possibility of cross-cultural moral agreement. The meaning of "honor," for example, can vary significantly across cultures.

The debate surrounding thick and thin concepts has implications for moral realism and anti-realism. Realists might argue that thick concepts reflect objective moral properties, while anti-realists might see them as products of subjective attitudes or cultural norms. The analysis of these concepts has far-reaching implications.